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ABSTRACT 
 
Conventional wisdom assumes that homeownership is risky because house prices are 
volatile.  But all households start life “short” housing services, and homeownership could be a less 
risky way of obtaining those services than the alternative, renting.  While a renter faces year-to-
year fluctuations in rent, a homeowner receives a guaranteed flow of housing services at a known 
price, and so is hedged against rent risk. Although the homeowner is in turn exposed to asset price 
risk when she sells her house, that risk can be relatively small since it arrives at the end of the stay 
in the house and so is discounted, or it is deferred even later if the homeowner moves to a 
correlated housing market.  We show in a stylized model with endogenous house prices that rent 
risk can indeed outweigh asset price risk. The net benefit of homeownership increases in the 
owner’s expected horizon in the home, as the number of rent risks avoided rises and the asset price 
risk occurs later in time.  This effect of horizon on the demand for owning should increase 
multiplicatively with the magnitude of the volatility of rents.  Another implication of our analysis is 
that the aggregate wealth effect from fluctuations in house prices may be small since higher prices 
are generally offset by equivalent increases in the expected cost of future housing services. 
We test these implications using MSA-level data on house prices and rent volatility 
matched with CPS data on homeownership. Consistent with the model, the difference in the 
probability of homeownership between households with long and short expected horizons in their 
residences is 2.9 to 5.4 percentage points greater in high rent variance MSAs than in low rent 
variance MSAs.  The sensitivity to rent risk is greatest for households that exogenously must 
devote a larger share of their budgets to housing.  Similarly, the “younger” elderly who live in high 
rent variance MSAs are more likely to own their own homes on average, but their probability of 
homeownership falls faster as they approach the end of life and their horizon shortens.  Finally, we 
find that the house price-to-rent ratio capitalizes not only expected future rents, but also the 
associated rent risk premia, consistent with asset pricing models. At the MSA level, a one standard 
deviation increase in rent variance increases the house price-to-rent ratio by 2 to 4 percent. 
 
Keywords: house prices, house price risk, rent risk, housing tenure choice, household risk 
management, aging and housing wealth 
JEL codes: R21, E21, G11, G12, J14
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 According to the 2000 Decennial Census, 68 percent of U.S. households own the house 
they live in.  Those households commit a substantial portion of their net worth to their house, 27 
percent on average [Poterba and Samwick (1997)].  For households with heads aged 65 and over, 
housing wealth comprises 45 percent of their non-Social Security wealth.  Conventional wisdom 
holds that this substantial, undiversified exposure to real estate assets makes home owning quite 
risky, since fluctuations in house prices can have a sizeable effect on households’ financial net 
worth.   
In this paper we demonstrate that homeownership is less risky than conventionally 
assumed.  The starting point of our analysis is that households are in effect born “short” housing 
services, since they have to live somewhere.  They must make up this housing deficit in some way. 
The key question is whether it is better to procure their desired housing services by renting or by 
owning. Renters are subject to annual fluctuations in rent, which is the spot price of housing 
services.  Since housing costs are the largest component of most households’ budgets, representing 
on average about a third of annual income, and market rents can be quite volatile (with an average 
standard deviation of 2.9 percentage points per year), this rent risk can be substantial.   
By contrast, a homeowner locks in the cost of future housing services by paying a known 
up-front price for a house that delivers a guaranteed stream of housing services. Buying a house is 
akin to purchasing a security that pays out annual dividends equal to the spot rent. Thus 
homeownership provides a hedge against fluctuations in the cost of housing services: if rents 
increase, the security pays just enough more to make up the difference. In practice this hedge is 
available only by owning.  Long-term rent contracts are rare in the U.S.: Genesove (1999) reports 
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that 97.7 percent of all residential leases are for terms of one year or less.  Also, one cannot 
purchase a “rent swap” to exchange variable rents for fixed rents.1   
In exchange for avoiding rent risk, the homeowner faces asset price risk when he moves (or 
dies) and sells the house. However, this risk can be low. The key reason that there is any asset price 
risk at all is that houses “outlive” their owners. That is, the hedges provided by houses last longer 
than their owners’ need to satisfy their short positions in housing services while avoiding rent risk. 
If residence spells were infinite (or in a dynastic setting, if descendents live in the same houses as 
their parents), homeownership would not be risky at all, since there would be no sale price risk. 
Even with a finite horizon, a household’s effective residence spell is longer than its actual one if it 
moves within the same or correlated housing markets. 
This analysis also implies that the aggregate wealth effect from fluctuations in house prices 
may be relatively small.  For example, in our framework an increase in house prices occurs because 
the expected present value of spot rents has risen (assuming no change in risk premia or discount 
rates).  This implies that households’ short positions in housing services have become more 
expensive to fulfill.  Hence increases in house prices that raise the net worth of current 
homeowners would generally be accompanied by a potentially offsetting decline in the effective 
wealth of renters and future homeowners.  Moreover, every housing transaction is just a transfer 
between a buyer and a seller, and so tends to wash out in the aggregate. 
Of course, homeownership does not strictly dominate renting.  Households must trade off 
the rent insurance benefit of owning against its asset price risk.  We illustrate this tradeoff with a 
stylized model of tenure choice in the presence of both rent risk and house price risk.  Since house 
                                                 
1 We can only speculate as to why more rent-insurance contracts do not exist.  One possibility is that the necessary 
contracting is difficult.  For example, presumably a swap would have to terminate if one party moved.  But if rents fell 
and the renter owed a sufficient amount of money on his half of the swap, he would simply move and exit the contract.  
In addition, it may be expensive to put such a swap in place for a long term. 
 3
prices endogenously capitalize the discounted value of future rents, the asset price risk increases 
with rent risk.  Which risk dominates on net is largely determined by households’ expected length 
of stay (horizon) in their houses.  For households with short horizons, the asset price risk is more 
likely to dominate, since there are few opportunities for rents to fluctuate and the asset price risk 
comes early in time.  But households with longer horizons experience a greater number of rent 
fluctuations and the asset price risk comes later in time and so is more heavily discounted. For 
these households the rent risk can outweigh the asset price risk, and so on net increase the demand 
for owning. The magnitude of the difference between rent risk and asset price risk increases with 
the volatility of rents. Hence greater rent volatility increases the rate at which the net rent risk and 
demand for owning increase with horizon – an implication that we exploit in our empirical 
analysis.   
The model also shows the implications of housing costs being correlated across location 
and time, by allowing for households to move across locations. Greater cross-sectional correlation 
in rents (and endogenously, in house prices) across current and future housing markets reduces the 
effective magnitude of asset price risk because the sale and purchase prices are more likely to 
offset. Even if the price of the future house is cross-sectionally uncorrelated with the price of the 
current house, to the degree that house prices are persistent over time, the purchase price of the 
future house is partially hedged by its own subsequent sale price, which also reduces total asset 
price risk.   
In contrast, the previous literature on housing tenure choice has largely ignored the tradeoff 
between the rent and asset price risks. Indeed, most studies neglect risk altogether and compute a 
deterministic user cost of housing.2  On the other hand, some recent contributions to the portfolio 
                                                 
2 The traditional user cost literature, e.g. Rosen (1979), Hendershott and Slemrod (1983), and Poterba (1984), estimates 
housing demand as a function of just expected returns on housing.  We know of only a few studies that consider rent 
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choice literature have modeled the demand for owning real estate assets, but they generally 
consider the associated asset price risk in isolation, neglecting the tenure decision and the riskiness 
of renting. Instead they focus on various costs of the asset price risk, such as the resulting 
distortions to homeowners’ saving and consumption behavior [Engelhardt (1996), Skinner (1989)], 
or to their financial portfolio allocations [Brueckner (1997), Flavin and Nakagawa (2003), Flavin 
and Yamashita (1998), Fratantoni (1997), and Goetzmann (1993)]. 3  Hence this paper can be seen 
as extending the existing literatures to account for a central but understudied element of household 
risk management.4  Our framework bears some similarities to term-structure models of long versus 
short duration bonds, in which holding a long bond provides insurance against fluctuations in short 
interest rates. 
Depending on the elasticity of supply of owned housing units, the insurance demand for 
home owning may show up in a higher homeownership rate, higher house prices, or both.  In an 
elastically supplied market, the additional demand for ownership that is due to net rent risk will be 
reflected in a greater probability of home owning.  In an inelastic market, house prices will be bid 
up by the marginal homebuyer until they capitalize not only the discounted value of expected 
                                                                                                                                                                 
risk. In a time series study, Rosen et al. (1984) finds that one predictor of the aggregate homeownership rate is the 
difference between the unforecastable volatility of the user cost of homeownership and rents.  They assume that rental 
housing and owner-occupied housing are independent goods, so they do not allow for an endogenous relation between 
house prices and rent. In Henderson and Ioannides (1983), the rent risk is to the landlord, not the tenant.  In their 
model, the tenant may not properly care for the property.  This incentive compatibility problem raises the average rent 
for renters but does not involve rent volatility. Ben-Shahar (1998) reverses the usual models by including uncertainty 
about rents but exogenous and riskless house prices. Thus there is no trade-off between rent and price risk in his model.  
In work subsequent to this paper, Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2002) develop an extended version of our framework that 
examines the implications of the covariance between rents and earnings. 
3 Skinner (1989) and Summers (1983) consider the asset price risk of the house, but not the value of housing as 
insurance against rent fluctuations. Davidoff (2003) measures asset price risk by how much house prices covary with 
labor income, and is primarily concerned with the effect of asset price risk on the amount of housing purchased in a 
portfolio context.  He assumes exogenous house prices and does not consider the tradeoff with rent risk.   
4 Other papers investigate alternative sources of household risk.  Cocco (2000) and Haurin (1991) investigate the 
effects of income risk on housing portfolio choice. Cocco also includes interest rate risk, in a parameterized structural 
model of housing investment, but he rules out the possibility of renting.  Campbell and Cocco (2003) use the 
covariance of income, interest rates, and house prices to explain whether people finance their house with fixed or 
floating rate debt.  However, their financing decision does not involve the tradeoff between rent expenditures and asset 
price risk. Other work emphasizes the negative effects of depressed house prices and housing equity on household 
mobility [Chan (2001), Genesove and Mayer (1997), Stein (1995)]. 
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future rents, but also the risk premia associated with the net rent risk.  In such a market, the price-
to-rent ratio should rise with rent volatility.  We test these implications empirically, using data on 
both homeownership rates and house prices. Overall we find that the tradeoff between rent risk and 
house price risk affects households’ behavior in ways consistent with our model. 
When we use household-level data on homeownership, our empirical strategy exploits the 
implication that the effect of expected horizon on the demand for homeownership should increase 
with rent volatility.  To isolate the effect of net rent risk from other reasons why households might 
own their houses, we control for both Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and individual 
heterogeneity, and compare the difference in the probability of homeownership for exogenously 
long- and short-horizon households, to see if this difference increases with rent volatility.5  In 
particular, we separately control for the rent variance in households’ MSAs and for their expected 
horizons, and then focus on the interaction of the rent variance with the horizon. The interaction 
term nets out the effect of unobserved factors like moving costs that might contaminate the direct 
relationship between homeownership and expected horizon.      
Using household-level data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) matched to MSA-
level rent data, we find that the estimated effect of rent risk on the probability of homeownership is 
small for households with average expected horizons, but substantially increases for households 
with longer horizons, consistent with our model. The difference between the likelihood of 
homeownership for a household with above-the-median expected horizon and that of a below-the-
median household is up to 5.4 percentage points greater in high rent variance MSAs than in low 
rent variance MSAs.  We also find evidence that the sensitivity to rent risk is greater for households 
that face a bigger housing gamble, and so might be effectively more risk averse, because typical 
                                                 
5 For example, homeownership can vary with income, demographics and tax benefits [Rosen (1979)], inflation 
[Summers (1981)], and the agency costs of renting [Henderson and Ioannides (1983)].  
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rents in their MSA comprise a relatively large portion of their annual income.  Among such 
households, those with long expected horizons are the most responsive to net rent risk, having a 6.1 
percentage point higher probability of homeownership relative to other households if they live in a 
MSA with high rent variance. 
The rent insurance benefit of owning is particularly large for the elderly.  The “younger” 
elderly in markets with high rent volatility are more likely to own their homes, consistent with their 
being generally more risk averse than the marginal homebuyer. All else equal, a household with a 
head who is 60 years old is 10.1 percentage points more likely to own its home if it lives in a 
market in the top quartile of rent variance (a level effect). But after age 65 or so, the probability of 
homeownership begins to decline with age, and more steeply in high rent variance markets. This 
slope effect is also consistent with our model, because as the end of life approaches, the rent 
insurance becomes less valuable as the number of periods for which a homeowner expects to be 
insured against rent risk falls, and the asset price risk is closer at hand. Thus the rent insurance 
benefit of homeownership may provide a partial explanation for the failure of the elderly to transit 
out of homeownership at as early an age as traditional life-cycle models predict [Venti and Wise 
(2000); Megbolugbe, et al (1997)].  
Unless the supply of owned housing is perfectly elastic, the extra demand for home owning 
due to rent risk also should be capitalized into house prices.  We measure the additional value to 
owning rather than renting by comparing house prices relative to rents.  The price-to-rent ratio for 
houses is analogous to the price-earnings ratio for stocks. Using MSA-level data, we find that 
house prices do indeed incorporate a premium for avoiding net rent risk.  We also find that the 
price-to-rent ratio increases with expected future rents, just as a price-earnings ratio should increase 
with expected future earnings. These results are consistent with our model and other asset-pricing 
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models of financial assets. At the MSA level, a one standard deviation increase in rent variance 
raises the average price-to-rent ratio in a market from 15.7 to as much as 16.3.  Holding rents 
constant, this corresponds to a 2 to 4 percent increase in house prices. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  In section I, we present a stylized model 
of tenure choice in the presence of both rent risk and house price risk.  Section II describes our data 
sources and variable construction.  The empirical methodology and results are reported in section 
III.  Section IV briefly concludes. 
 
I. A simple model of the insurance benefit of owner-occupied housing 
This section presents a simple model of tenure choice in which the cost of securing housing 
services is uncertain and house prices are endogenous. The model is stylized in order to highlight 
certain key tradeoffs between the risks of renting versus those of home owning, so we make a 
number of simplifying assumptions. Consider a representative, risk-averse household that lives for 
N years, labeled 0 through N-1, after which it dies. To begin with, suppose the household lives in 
only one residence, making a single tenure decision at birth in year 0. (We will later consider the 
additional effects if households can move after some time to another location, with housing costs 
possibly correlated across locations.) For convenience rental units and owner-occupied houses 
provide the same flow of housing services.6  The household chooses at birth its desired quantity of 
housing services, normalized to be one unit, which it cannot change during its lifetime.  Assuming 
                                                 
6 Equivalently, the household can be thought of as choosing between owning and renting the same house. The 
comparative statics below can be generalized to allow the services from the owner-occupied house to exceed those 
from renting, perhaps due to agency problems. In practice rent risk might also reduce the desired size of rental space 
(the intensive margin). While this effect is consistent with the insurance motives under investigation, here it would 
make it more difficult to find an effect on the rent versus own (extensive) margin that we analyze empirically. Hence 
our results will provide a lower bound for the full importance of the rent insurance motive. 
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perfect capital markets and known, exogenous lifetime wealth, the household’s tenure choice will 
maximize the expected utility of its wealth net of its housing costs.7,8   
The household will accordingly compare the risk-adjusted costs of renting versus owning.  
Renting is akin to paying for housing services on a spot market.  Spot rents fluctuate year to year 
due to exogenous shocks to the underlying local economy and housing market.9 Suppose these 
rents can be described as following a general AR(1) process: rt = µ + ϕrt−1 + ηt, where φ∈[0,1]  
measures the degree of persistence in rents, µ measures the expected level or growth rate of rents 
(depending on φ), and the shocks η to rents are distributed IID(0,σ2).10   
Because there are no capital market imperfections, ex post households care only about their 
total housing costs.  Initially, when choosing whether to rent or own, they project forward to the 
ends of their lives and forecast how much they will have spent ex post on housing under each 
                                                 
7 Relaxing these assumptions would be complex and not add to our basic insights concerning rent and price risk. 
Davidoff (2003) finds that the correlation of rents with income could further affect the relative riskiness of renting. In 
preliminary analysis, we controlled for this type of correlation in our empirical work and found that it does not affect 
our primary results.  The model in Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2002) allows heterogeneous households to make 
intermediate changes in tenure.   
8 If the household has a bequest motive, fluctuations in its housing costs lead to uncertainty in the value of its bequest. 
Hence the household will still want to consider asset price risk when minimizing the risk-adjusted costs of fulfilling its 
desire for housing services. The two-location extension below applies if the children use the bequest to buy their own 
house.  A partial bequest motive, where the parents do not value their children’s utility as highly as their own, would 
lead to a partial reduction in the cost to the parent of the terminal asset price risk.   
9 Changes in the spot rent are generated by variation in the demand for housing services.  Any number of local 
economic conditions fluctuate over time and across space, from the success of locally concentrated industries that 
raises workers’ wages to increased immigration or in-migration leading to a larger population.  Of course, changes in 
demand do not necessarily get capitalized into rents.  If housing is perfectly elastically supplied, rents are set by 
construction costs, and greater demand would lead to more housing units, not higher prices.  If housing is at least 
partially inelastically supplied -- perhaps due to zoning, a limited supply of land, time lags in construction, or (when 
demand falls) an existing durable housing stock (see Glaeser and Gyourko, (2004)) -- then some portion of the changes 
in demand would show up in rents.  As supply becomes more inelastic, underlying demand volatility will have an 
increasingly large effect on the volatility of rents.  In an earlier version of this paper, we found that rent volatility is a 
function of underlying volatility in the unemployment rate interacted with the inelasticity of supply of housing in the 
local market (proxied by regulatory constraints on building). These results used cross-MSA variation, however, which 
is only suggestive, given potential MSA-level heterogeneity.  
10 We take the spot rent process as given, without modeling its underlying determinants. Whatever the ultimate 
determinants, the model correctly specifies the endogenous relationship that results between rents and house prices. 
This approach is analogous to other asset-pricing models. For instance, in term structure models of long versus short 
maturity bonds, the process for short rates (analogous to our rental rates) is the exogenous input into the model. In 
models of stock prices, the input is the process for firm cash flows, and the stochastic price of a stock at sale is 
analogous to our house sale price. 
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tenure option; and they evaluate the corresponding ex ante expected utilities. For renters, the ex 
post total cost of renting, discounted to the final year N-1, is ( ∑
−
=
−−− +
1
1
)1(1
0
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t
N RrRr )  ≡ CR RN-1, 
where R is the gross interest rate, for simplicity a constant, and CR is the total cost of renting, 
discounted back to year 0.  The initial rent r0 is observed at the time of the tenure decision at time 
0, but the future rents are unknown. (The tildes identify stochastic variables as of time 0.) It will be 
convenient below to discount all values back to the initial year 0 using the discount factor δ ≡ 1/R. 
Then the (ex post) utility of being a renter, UR, can be simply expressed as a function of the present 
value of lifetime wealth W less the present discounted cost CR of the rents that are paid: 
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 The household can avoid the uncertainty of the future rents by buying its residence in year 
0. The house is like a security that pays out in perpetuity annual dividends equal to the spot rent, 
thus providing a hedge against rent risk. However, while the initial purchase price P0 is observed 
(and will be determined in equilibrium below), the sale price PN  is stochastic. Since house prices 
will endogenously capitalize future rents, the sale price will fluctuate with the rent shocks.  This 
exposes the homeowner to asset price risk at the end of life when he sells the house.11  Hence the 
(ex post) cost of owning, again discounted back to year 0, is Co ≡ N
N PP ~0 δ− , the difference 
between the purchase price of the house and the discounted proceeds from the subsequent sale of 
                                                 
11 We assume a stationary economy with a sequence of representative households owning and renting a fixed supply of 
housing and rental units. For consistency, the sale to the next generation is assumed to take place at the beginning of 
year N, with PN determined when rN is observed, etc.  
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the house.12  The utility of being an owner, UO, is just a function of lifetime wealth less the 
discounted cost Co:  ( )NNOO PPWUCWUU ~)( 0 β+−=−= .   
We assume that in equilibrium house prices are endogenously determined such that 
households are ex ante indifferent between owning and renting, with E0 UO = E0 UR, so that both 
owned and rented housing units are occupied. In our model, which implicitly assumes a fixed 
supply of housing, the equilibrium house price P0 can be used to measure the demand for owning 
relative to renting.  Of course, the extent to which demand is empirically capitalized into house 
prices depends on the elasticity of supply. We will return to this distinction later.  
 Under the above assumptions one can show that the equilibrium house price takes the 
following form: 
N
OR NNrPVP
δ
σπσπ
µ
−
−
+=
1
),(),(
),(
22
00      (1) 
The house price is the sum of two terms: the present value of expected rents, PV, plus the net risk 
premium, which consists of the difference between the risk premium associated with renting, Rπ , 
and the risk premium associated with owning, Oπ .
13 We discuss each of these components in turn. 
                                                 
12 For simplicity we abstract from other factors that affect homeownership and rental costs, such as the tax treatment of 
homeownership, maintenance, and depreciation. Such factors may affect the relative cost of owning and renting, but 
they will not qualitatively change the comparative statics at issue here regarding the effects of increases in rent 
volatility.  For example, since interest rates are nearly equal across the country and depreciation schedules are set at the 
federal level, variation in them over time will not affect our cross-sectional results.  Property taxes are incorporated in 
rents and thus do not differ between owners and renters.  Owners have a great degree of flexibility over the timing of 
maintenance costs, which mitigates their short-run risk; and their long-run maintenance expenditure should be 
relatively predictable [Gyourko and Tracy (2004)].  Landlords pass along maintenance costs for renters, and thus the 
maintenance risk is properly measured in our estimate of rent variance. Berkovec and Fullerton (1992) argue that taxes 
provide some risk sharing between homeowners and the government.  We will control for tax regime changes over 
time in the empirical work. 
13  In short, to solve the model we equate the certainty-equivalent utilities of renting and owning, UR( W -E0CR(r0,µ) - 
πR(η1,η2,..,ηN-1) ) = UO( W -E0CO(P0,r0,µ) - πO(η1,η2,..,ηN) ), after recursively expressing each rent rt as a function of r0, 
µ, and the shocks η1 to ηt that arise after year 0: rt = ϕtr0 + µΣi=1tϕi-1  + Σi=1tϕt-iηi. As explained below, the price PN can 
be expressed as a function of rN and so recursively also as a function of r0,µ, and η1 to ηN. From this equation we solve 
for the house price P0 = P0(r0,µ, πR-πO). 
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 The PV term reflects the observation that the value of a house reflects the value of the 
housing services that it provides, which is akin to paying out the spot rents: 
( )




−
+
−
=
δ
δµ
δϕ
µ
11
1),( 00 rrPV        (2) 
The value of these payments is greater than the current rent r0; the second term in the parentheses 
captures the expected present value of the future rents, which depend on µ, in perpetuity.14  Just as 
a price-earnings ratio increases with expected future earnings, the difference between the house 
price and the current rent will increase with expected future rents. The factor (1/[1-δϕ]) >1 reflects 
the persistence of rents: with φ>0, each increase in rent continues to augment the rents in 
subsequent periods.  
Rπ  measures the risk associated with renting. It is the risk premium that would leave the 
household indifferent between paying the discounted cost of renting CR  (= ∑
−
=
+
1
1
0
~N
t
t
t rr δ ), which is 
stochastic, versus paying its expected value E0 CR and the premium. This premium can be 
approximated as: 
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where α measures household risk-aversion. To interpret this result, note that the outer summation 
corresponds to the N-1 rent shocks η1 to ηN-1 that are avoided by owning, with the later shocks 
discounted more heavily (using δn).  The inner summation reflects the fact that if ϕ>0, each shock 
continues to affect rents in subsequent periods, in proportion to its persistence ϕ.  For instance, if 
the rent shocks are IID, with ϕ=0, then the inner summation disappears and Rπ  is simply equal to 
                                                 
14 This is true even when the households’ horizon N is finite, since when each household sells the house, the sale price 
will in turn reflect the value of the subsequent rents, appropriately discounted.  
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(α/2)*σ2 Σn=1N-1(δn)2 = (α/2)*σ2 [δ2 + δ 4+…+ δ (N-1)2]. Note that Rπ  increases with both N, the 
number of rent shocks the renter faces, and with σ2, the magnitude of the rent shocks. Because 
owning provides the benefit of avoiding the rent shocks, their corresponding risk premia get bid 
into house prices, so Rπ  enters equation (1) with a positive sign. This has the important implication 
that rent risk tends to increase the demand for home owning, ceteris paribus.  
The risk premium Oπ  measures the risk associated with the discounted cost of owning Co 
(= N
N PP ~0 δ− ), due to the stochastic sale price PN:  
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Equations (1) and (2) imply that house prices can be expressed as a linear function of 
contemporaneous rents, and so house prices endogenously inherit the riskiness of the rent process.  
Hence the sale price PN will vary with the contemporaneous rent shock ηN and, if rents are 
persistent, with the previous shocks η1 to ηN-1 as well. The summation term in equation (4) reflects 
the effect of these previous shocks when φ>0. Further, as the volatility of rents σ2 increases, the 
sale price PN becomes increasingly risky.  For instance, if rents are IID with φ=0, then the 
summation term disappears because the previous shocks do not affect PN, and so Oπ  is simply 
equal to (α/2)*σ2(δN)2. In this case the sale price risk is of the same magnitude as the individual 
rent risks, but discounted using δN since the sale price is realized N years after purchase.  However, 
as the rent shocks become more persistent as φ increases, the sale price risk increases. More of the 
prior rent shocks accumulate and are embedded into the sale price, increasing the magnitude of the 
summation term. For instance, if rent shocks are fully persistent, with φ=1, then Oπ  equals 
(α/2)*Nσ2[δN/(1-δ)]2. (This is greater than (α/2)*σ2(δN)2 under φ=0, since all N rent shocks η1 to 
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ηN get fully reflected in the sale price.) Oπ enters equation (1) with a negative sign, so unlike rent 
risk the asset price risk reduces the demand for owner-occupied housing, ceteris paribus. 
Returning to equation (1), note that if the spot rents are riskless (σ2 =0) or if households are 
risk neutral (α=0), then the house price P0 reflects only the expected rental costs in the PV term, as 
in Poterba (1984). Otherwise, the house price also reflects the net risk premium associated with 
renting relative to owning, Rπ  - Oπ . Since both owning and renting are risky, the tenure decision 
must consider the tradeoff between the two risky options, rather than either option in isolation. If 
the sign of the net risk premium is positive, renting is riskier on balance than owning, and so the 
house price P0 would be greater than the PV term. That is, risk averse households would bid up the 
house price because of the hedging benefit that the house provides against rent risk. Moreover, 
since the net risk premium is proportional to the volatility of rents σ2, the house price would then 
increase with σ2, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, if the sign of the net risk premium is negative, 
owning is riskier on balance than renting, and then the house price would decrease with σ2.     
 For example, in the IID case (φ=0) equation (1) implies that the price-to-rent differential, 
which is a convenient way to normalize prices, can be written as follows:  
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In the square brackets the net risk premium includes N-1 positive premia for the rent shocks η1 to 
ηN-1 that are avoided by owning the house, minus one premium for the sale price risk due to PN, all 
appropriately discounted.  Thus the net risk premium depends on N, the household’s expected 
horizon in the residence.  As N increases, the renter faces more rent shocks, which increases the 
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rent risk-premium Rπ ; whereas the sale price risk comes later in time, and is thus discounted more 
heavily, which reduces the risk premium for owning Oπ .  
 In this IID case, because the house price risk is of the same magnitude as the individual rent 
risks but discounted more heavily, the rent risks dominate and the net risk premium is necessarily 
positive for any N.  In this case the price-rent differential would unambiguously increase with σ2. 
In contrast, as rent shocks become more persistent (with ϕ>0), the sale price risk increases in 
magnitude. Even though Rπ  also increases with φ, Oπ can increase by even more, so it is possible 
that the sale price risk outweighs the rent risks for small N, making the net risk premium negative.  
For large N the net risk-premium tends to be positive, with renting being riskier than owning.  For 
intermediate levels of N, the net risk premium can be small and of either sign.  Hence, the average 
effect of rent risk σ2 on house prices is theoretically ambiguous in sign, depending on the horizon 
of the marginal household, and possibly small in magnitude.15  Nevertheless, whichever risk 
dominates on average, the net rent risk increases with N.  
 Another factor affects house prices in equilibrium.  In equation (1) the term (1/[1-δN]) >1 
multiplying the net risk premium reflects the fact that the sale price PN will also incorporate the net 
risk premium (to leave future owners indifferent between owning and renting) and, to compensate, 
this premium is recursively embedded into the initial purchase price P0.  For instance, if the net risk 
premium is positive, thus raising PN, in equilibrium P0 must also be increased sufficiently to keep 
the initial owner indifferent between renting and owning, taking into account that he will later sell 
at PN and recoup the net risk premium, albeit at a discount. Note that the factor 1/[1-δN] declines 
                                                 
15 Case and Shiller (1989) find that changes in house prices exhibit some persistence.  That can be explained in our 
framework if rents are not random walks.  In our annual, MSA-level rent data φ  is about 0.6-0.7. In this case, using a 
discount factor of δ = 0.94, the net risk premium in this stylized model is positive so long as the horizon N is greater 
than 3 to 4 years. 
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with N: the later the premium in the sale price PN is recouped, the less valuable it is, and so the 
smaller need be the compensating effect on P0.16 
 This effect complicates the overall impact of the horizon N on the house price, which works 
through the term (πR - πO) /(1-δN) in equation (1).  As N increases, the net risk premium in the 
numerator of this term increases, but the denominator also increases.  For φ=1 the entire term is 
monotonically increasing in N, but for φ<1 it can be non-monotonic in N.  For empirically 
reasonable values of around φ=0.7 and δ=0.94, the term rises steeply with N for N=2-20 years, then 
slightly declines and plateaus. That is, for horizons of up to 20 years, the accumulating rent risks 
tend to dominate the effect of 1/(1-δN), causing the demand for homeownership to increase with N.  
The horizon N in equation (1) interacts multiplicatively with the volatility of rents σ2. As 
noted above, as rent volatility increases, the riskiness of renting and owning both increase.  The 
sign of the net effect depends on the household’s horizon, and the magnitude of the net effect also 
depends on σ2, which amplifies the difference between the two tenure options.  That is, in a city 
with low rent volatility, a household that prefers owning because it has a long expected horizon in 
its house prefers it by less than an otherwise identical household living in a high rent volatility city. 
We highlight this interaction effect because, in providing empirical support for the model, we will 
focus on the interaction of rent volatility with horizon, Nσ2. This will allow us to isolate the effects 
of rent risk from other factors that might also generate a relationship between the demand for 
homeownership and either N or σ2 separately. 
 The degree of risk-aversion α also enters equation (1) multiplicatively.  As α increases, the 
effects of rent volatility and horizon grow in magnitude.  Households that are more risk-averse, or 
                                                 
16 Analogously, fixed moving/transactions costs would reduce P0, ceteris paribus, according to the present value of the 
costs, again to compensate homeowners. 
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equivalently households that take on larger effective housing gambles, should be more sensitive to 
rent risk given their horizons. 
This analysis suggests that the aggregate wealth effect from house price fluctuations is 
likely to be relatively small.  Equation (1) implies that, absent changes in risk premia or discount 
rates, increases in house prices reflect a commensurate increase in the present value of expected 
future rents, which increases the cost of fulfilling households’ short position in housing services. 
For homeowners with infinite horizons, this increase in effective liabilities would exactly offset the 
increase in the house value (their long position), leaving their effective expected net worth 
unchanged. Even for homeowners with finite horizons, every housing transaction is just a transfer 
between a buyer and a seller.  That is, a higher house price may raise the net worth of a current 
owner, but the household who will purchase that house faces an offsetting reduction in net worth.  
If the propensity to consume out of wealth is similar on average across buyers and sellers, then any 
resulting wealth effects from house price fluctuations would tend to wash out.  For this reason, 
absent liquidity and collateral constraints, one would expect to find relatively small effects of 
changes in housing wealth on aggregate consumption.17  This might help explain why studies of the 
propensity to consume out of housing wealth find smaller effects at the aggregate level than at the 
micro level.18 
At the household level, the model shows why homeownership is not as risky as often 
assumed. In fact, if houses did not outlast their owners, owning would be completely riskless.  If 
                                                 
17 Indeed, bringing renters back into the picture can potentially reverse the usual logic regarding wealth effects. 
Consider an increase in house prices that is due to an increase in expected future rents. Renters (either current renters or 
future renters depending on the timing of the rent increases) would experience a negative wealth effect due to the 
increased housing costs. So it is possible for aggregate consumption to decline at the same time that house prices rise, 
especially if the asset-price effect on the buying and selling households is approximately a wash.  In concurrent 
research, Bajari, Benkard, and Krainer (2003) find small aggregate welfare consequences of a change in house prices, 
even if households adjust their consumption in response.  However, if otherwise constrained households are able to 
borrow against their housing equity, then increases in house prices can increase aggregate consumption. 
18 See Case, Quigley and Shiller (2003) and  Skinner (1996).  
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their residence spells were infinite, households would purchase a house for the known market price 
P0 and never sell. Even with finite horizons, in a dynastic setting in which households pass on the 
house for their descendents to live in, the effective horizon in the house would again be infinite.19 
In these cases, since utility is determined by the housing service flow rather than by the house 
price, unrealized house price fluctuations impose no cost on the household.20  The house would 
provide a perfect hedge against rent risk.  This hedge would come at the cost of a larger ex ante 
price (equation (1) with N=∞). 
In contrast, with finite horizons houses must be sold at the end of life, which leads to asset 
price risk ex post.  In that case the value of avoiding the rent risk net of the asset price risk is 
appropriately capitalized into the initial purchase price of the house so as to make the representative 
household indifferent ex ante between owning and renting. Of course, households’ residence spells 
are often shorter than their remaining lifetimes because households move. In the next subsection, 
we show that this asset price risk from moving can be small. 
 
Multiple Locations and Residence Spells 
To show the implications of housing costs being correlated across locations and over time, 
we extend the model to accommodate moving and multiple residence spells in different locations. 
Unlike at the end-of-life in the one-location model, when a household moves it purchases another 
                                                 
19 Even if a household sells its house at death, if it bequeaths the proceeds to its descendents and they use the 
inheritance to buy another house in the same or correlated market, the effective horizon is again longer. Conversely, if 
a household does not care about the sale price of its house, perhaps because it does not have time to consume against 
this value before its death, the house price risk can be irrelevant even with a finite horizon.   
20 This analysis neglects the role of housing as collateral. If the house were a mechanism for borrowing, declines in 
house prices could potentially reduce a household’s welfare even if its horizon is infinite.  In that case, the household 
would trade off rent risk net of the collateral-induced asset price risk against the sale price risk, so the same trade-off 
arguments apply.  For a general discussion of liquidity constraints, see Zeldes (1989), Jappelli (1990), and Jappelli et 
al. (1998). 
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house, which introduces additional asset price risk but also corresponding cross-sectional and inter-
temporal hedges, which work to offset this risk.  
To extend the original, one-location model to incorporate these factors in the simplest 
possible way, consider just two locations, labeled A and B. Households live in A for N years and 
then move to B and live there for N more years, after which they die.  Location B can be interpreted 
as the rest of the country, an amalgamation of the many locations to which a household could 
possibly move.  To simplify, we assume that households decide at birth in year 0 either to be 
homeowners, owning in A and then B, or to be renters, in A and then B, and they do not adjust the 
quantity of housing services when they move.21 Suppose that the spot rent processes in the two 
locations follow correlated AR(1) processes: )(1
B
t
A
t
A
t
AA
t krr ρηηϕµ +++= −  and 
)(1
B
t
A
t
B
t
BB
t krr ηρηϕµ +++= − , where η
A and ηB are independently distributed IID(0,σ2A) and 
IID(0,σ2B). ρ parameterizes the cross-sectional correlation in housing costs across the two 
locations, which in our framework is naturally modeled as correlation in the spot rents. If ρ=0 the 
rents, and endogenously the house prices, in A and B are independent; if ρ=1 they are perfectly 
correlated. To control the total magnitude of housing shocks incurred as ρ varies, the scaling 
constant k can be set to 1/(1+ρ2)1/2. 22 
                                                 
21 The choice and timing of the move is assumed to be exogenous: the household moves to B with certainty after N 
years, and knows this from the start of year 0. Allowing for interior probabilities of moving, at various times to various 
locations, would unduly complicate the model without changing qualitatively the points we would like to make. We 
note, however, that in the presence of transactions costs, the possibility of being (exogenously) forced to move out of 
an owned house earlier than expected is an important additional risk associated with owning; whereas renting probably 
provides more flexibility to adjust to shocks. On the other hand, allowing for endogenous moving could help reduce the 
risks of both renting and owning, as households can move to a location with lower housing costs.  
22 The (conditional) variance of rents in A is VA = Et-1(rtA)2 = k2(σA2 + ρ2σB2), and similarly the variance of rents in B is 
VB = k2(σB2 + ρ2σA2). In the symmetric case with σA2 = σB2 = σ2, using k=1/(1+ρ2)1/2 implies that VA = VB = σ2, a 
constant independent of ρ. Also in the symmetric case, the (conditional) correlation between rents rtA and rtB is 
2ρ/(1+ρ2), which monotonically increases in [0,1] with ρ. 
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The (ex post) utility of being a homeowner, again discounting all values back to year 0, is 
now ( )( )BNNBNANNAO PPPPWUU 220 ~~~ δδ +−+−= , where the move takes place in year N. The initial 
purchase price P0A in A is observed, but the future sale price PNA in A and the purchase and sale 
prices PNB and P2NB in B are unknown as of year 0 and so impose asset price risk. The utility of 
being a renter depends on the discounted cost of rents paid in A and then B,  
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Suppose that in equilibrium house prices adjust to leave households ex ante indifferent 
between owning and renting, with E0 UO = E0 UR.23  The equilibrium price P0A in A will be 
forward-looking, taking into account the subsequent move to B. One can show that P0A will be a 
function of the expected present value of rents in A, plus the net risk premium for renting versus 
owning in A and B )( ABO
AB
R ππ − , less the discounted risk premium for renting versus owning in B 
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Our discussion will focus on ABOπ , the risk of being a homeowner in A and B. We will only briefly 
discuss the other terms, since they are analogous to terms in the one-location case above.  
The PV(rA, µA) term has the same form as equation (2), now applied to the rent process in 
location A. The risk premium for renting in A and B, ABRπ , is analogous to equation (3), but now 
                                                 
23 We assume a stationary, overlapping generations structure: the next generation is born N years later. The new buyers 
buy the house in location A from the previous generation, then N years after that buy the house in location B. Whether 
a household owned or rented in location A, once it gets to location B, the equilibrium price in B is assumed to leave it 
indifferent between owning and renting in B, as in the one-location case. Generalizing the timing of the one-location 
case above, PNA and PNB are assumed to be determined when rNA and rNB are observed at the start of period N, and P2NB 
is determined when r2NB is observed at the start of period 2N. 
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reflects all of the rent shocks η1A to η2N-1A and η1B to η2N-1B that are avoided by owning.24  The 
“embedded” risk premium )( BO
B
R
N ππδ −  reflects the fact that when the household purchases a 
house in A, it knows that it will subsequently pay price PNB when it moves to B, and that PNB will 
include a net risk premium for the net housing risk avoided by owning while in B, as in the one-
location analysis. For instance, if the net risk premium in B is positive, raising the cost PNB of 
buying the second house, to compensate households will lower the price P0A they are willing to pay 
for the first house. Since the household spends its final N years in location B, the risk premia BRπ  
and BOπ  take the same form as equations (3) and (4) for a single residence spell of length N, but 
their effective rent variance is now σ =  k2( 222 AB σρσ + ), reflecting the spill-over of the shocks from 
A into B depending on the correlation ρ. In equation (6) these embedded risk premia are 
additionally discounted by δN since PNB is paid in period N.  
 The risk of being a homeowner, ABOπ , extends the one-location analysis to include the 
additional asset-price risk from moving and having multiple residence spells: 
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Inside the curly brackets the first summation multiplying σ2B (and σ2A respectively), 
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iN ϕϕ , captures the effects of the early shocks η1B to ηNB (and η1A to ηNA) on all 
three prices PNA, PNB and P2NB, depending on the persistence ϕ of the shocks (as in equation (4)) 
                                                 
24 While the renter lives in A only in years 1 to N-1, when ρ>0 the later location-A shocks ηNA to η2N-1A spill over into 
the rents rNB to r2N-1B that the renter faces in location B. Similarly, the earlier location-B shocks η1B to ηN-1B spill over 
into the rents r1A to rN-1A the renter faces in location A. 
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and now also on their cross-sectional correlation ρ. Similarly, the second summation 
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iN ϕϕ captures the effects of the late shocks ηN+1B to η2NB (and ηN+1A to η2NA) on 
P2NB. The key new hedging effects are reflected in the terms in square brackets: HB = 
[ ]2)1( NNϕδρ −−  and HA =  [ ]2)1(1 NNϕδρ −− , where the ρ-1 and 1-ρ terms reflect a cross-
sectional hedge, and the )1( NNϕδ− terms an intertemporal hedge. 
Focusing first on the intertemporal hedge, when housing costs in A and B are completely 
uncorrelated, with ρ=0, then HB = [ ]2)1( NNϕδ− .  While the shocks η1B to ηNB lead to uncertainty 
in the purchase price PNB in period N, if ϕ>0 this uncertainty is partially offset by their oppositely 
signed effect on the subsequent sale price P2NB of the same house, which is discounted by an 
additional δN since the sale takes place N periods later. If prices in B turn out to be high when the 
household buys in year N, the sale price in year 2N would also be expected to be high, dampening 
the effect on the overall cost of owning.  The value of this intertemporal hedge increases with the 
persistence of rents. If rents are serially uncorrelated, with ϕ=0, there is no intertemporal hedge and 
HB = 1. If rents are a random walk, with ϕ=1, but for discounting (and the drift µ) the sale price 
would in expectation exactly offset the purchase price, reducing the amount of asset price risk, with 
HB declining to [ ]2)1( Nδ− .  Also, when ρ=0 then HA = 1, reflecting just the effects of the location-
A shocks η1A to ηNA on PNA, since these shocks would not spillover into prices in location B. 
By contrast, turning to the cross-sectional hedge, if housing costs in A and B are perfectly 
correlated, with ρ=1, then HB = HA= [ ]2)( NNϕδ .  Notice that the effects of the rent shocks on PNA 
and PNB have canceled each other out (as the ρ-1 and 1-ρ terms canceled), leaving only the lagged 
effects on P2NB if the shocks are persistent (ϕ>0). This occurs because, when the household sells its 
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original house in A, it immediately purchases the new house in B.  If rents in the two locations are 
perfectly correlated, this transaction is a wash sale, providing a cross-sectional hedge akin to 
moving within a local housing market with common prices. On the other hand, once PNB washes 
out it is no longer serving as an intertemporal hedge with P2NB. Nonetheless one can show that, in 
the symmetric case with k = 1/(1+ρ2)1/2 and σ2B = σ2A, ABOπ is on balance smaller with ρ=1 than 
with ρ=0, and as a result P0A is larger with ρ=1. The cross-sectional correlation in house prices 
reduces the net risk of owning, justifying higher house prices, ceteris paribus. 
 This analysis assumed that households do not adjust the size of their housing consumption 
bundles on moving.  If we allowed such adjustments, house price fluctuations could actually 
increase owners’ utility. Consider, in a partial equilibrium setting without adjustment costs, the 
consumption bundles that a household could choose if house prices fluctuate, using a revealed 
preference argument. If house prices rise, an infinitely-lived household could stay in its existing 
house and maintain its original level of utility.  Or, it could sell its appreciated house, purchase a 
smaller house, and use the remaining proceeds to consume more non-housing goods, if doing so 
makes it better off.  Conversely, if house prices fall, the household could stay in the existing house 
and maintain its original level of utility, or substitute toward housing by consuming fewer non-
housing goods and buying a bigger house.  In either case, by revealed preference, the household is 
no worse off and might be better off.25  
While this analysis of multiple locations is stylized, it illustrates some of the key ways that 
moving and multiple residence spells affect the risk of home owning and renting. In sum, when 
housing costs are perfectly correlated cross-sectionally, house-to-house moves do not generate any 
asset price risk at the time of the move, which effectively extends the homeowners’ horizons.  The 
                                                 
25 We thank Ed Glaeser for this example. 
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risk from moving increases as housing costs in the two locations become less correlated.  However, 
even a move to an uncorrelated location is not as risky as it might initially seem because 
fluctuations in the future purchase price are partially offset by the subsequent future sale price, 
insofar as housing shocks are persistent over time. On the other hand, even a move to a perfectly 
correlated location entails some asset price risk if the subsequent sale is not also a wash.  (In the 
case of a bequest at death, there will still be asset price risk if the descendants live in an 
uncorrelated market.) In any case, house prices and the demand for home owning still generally 
vary with households’ expected horizon in a house and local rent risk. 
 
II. Data and variable construction 
To test the implications of the model described in section I, we need rent and house price 
data at the market level and data on homeownership and demographic characteristics at the 
household level.  To this end we combine four data sets. 
We obtained an index of median apartment rents by MSA from Reis, a commercial real 
estate information company.26  The index runs annually from 1981 to 1998, with 47 MSAs 
observed consistently throughout the sample.  Rents are converted to real dollars using the CPI 
excluding shelter.  In light of the available sample period, we measure expected rent growth for an 
MSA in a given year as the average annual growth rate in rents over the preceding nine years.  
Similarly the rent variance (σ2r) for each MSA-year is the variance in the MSA’s de-trended log 
rents over the prior nine years.27  We use the log of rent to keep MSAs with high rent levels from 
having artificially high rent variances. 
                                                 
26 Reis collects its data from surveys of owners of “Class A,” or top-quality, apartment buildings in each MSA. 
27 Specifically, the growth rate of rent is defined as the average change in log rent over the prior nine-year period.  Rent 
variance is then computed using the within-MSA annual differences between the actual log rent and the calculated 
average growth rate, and thus is expressed as a percentage of the base rent.  Using rent variance to measure rent risk is 
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 House price growth is computed in a similar manner for each MSA-year using the Freddie 
Mac repeat-sales house price index over the same nine-year moving windows.  To obtain the level 
of house prices in a given year, we inflate the MSA’s median house price from the 1990 Census by 
the corresponding growth rate from the Freddie Mac index and convert to real dollars using the CPI 
excluding shelter.  When we estimate the effect of rent variance on the house price-to-rent ratio, we 
merge the rent and house price data sets by MSA, yielding 44 MSA-level observations per year.28  
Due to the nine-year windows over which we estimate rent variance, and the fact that we will 
always use the one-year lagged rent variance in the analysis, we can estimate rent variance for the 
1990-1999 period.  This leaves us with 396 MSA-year observations. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics on MSA rents and prices. Rent risk is quite substantial. 
Between 1990 and 1998, the mean (across and within MSAs) standard deviation of real rent was 
2.9 percent per year.  This is over half of the size of the standard deviation of real house prices, 
which averaged 4.6 percent over the same period.  The variability in rents dwarfed real rent growth: 
between 1990 and 1998 real rents grew only one-tenth of one percent on average per year.  Real 
house price growth, as well, was approximately zero.  The average price-to-rent ratio is 15.7, so 
homeowners typically pay nearly 16 times the MSA’s annual median apartment rent for their 
houses, though this figure varies considerably across MSAs.29 
Most of the sample means are fairly constant over time, exhibiting little difference between 
the 1990-1998 averages in the first panel of table 1 and the values for 1998 alone in the second 
panel.  For instance, the standard deviation of the rent volatilities is 0.017 for 1990-98 and 0.012 
                                                                                                                                                                 
analogous to using income variance to measure income risk, as is done in studies of the effects of income risk on 
portfolio choice [e.g., Heaton and Lucas (2000)].  
28 Of the 47 MSAs with rent data, three do not have matching house price data. 
29 Part of the reason that owner-occupied housing commands such a large multiple to rent is that the median house 
price reflects a greater quantity of (or, equivalently, “nicer”) housing than the median apartment rent does.  As long as 
the difference between the amount of housing in the median house and in the median apartment does not spuriously 
vary across MSAs over time in a way that is correlated with rent variance, it will not affect our estimation. 
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for 1998. This implies that much of the variation in the data comes from cross-sectional differences 
across the 44 MSAs rather than from changes over time. In particular, rent risk varies significantly 
across MSAs, with the volatility of rent ranging from 1.4 percent standard deviation in Fort 
Lauderdale to 7.2 percent in Austin.  In 1998 the rent risks were even larger relative to the house 
price risks, compared to earlier in the decade: the average standard deviation of real rent in 1998 
was 2.3 percent and that of real house prices was 2.8 percent. 
Homeownership rates and individual level data are obtained from the 1990 and 1999 CPS 
March Annual Demographic Supplements.30  The CPS reports whether households own or rent 
their residences as well as a number of demographic variables such as age, race, education, 
occupation, marital status, and total household income.31 In addition, we impute the probability of a 
household’s staying in the same residence (whether rented or owned) for another year as the 
proportion of households in the same age-occupation-marital status cell (excluding the household 
in question) in that year that did not move in the previous year.32  This probability of staying, 
P(STAYS), will form our proxy for the expected horizon (length of stay in the residence) N, with a 
high probability of staying corresponding to a high N.33   
The sample averages of the key CPS variables are reported in table 2.  In particular, during 
the sample period 60 percent of the CPS households lived in an owner-occupied house.  There is 
considerable cross-sectional variation in the homeownership rate, especially considering the fact 
                                                 
30 The 1990 and 1999 years divide our rent data into two periods with nine annual observations each.  By using these 
two years, our estimated rent variances (which are based on nine-year rolling windows) will each be generated from a 
non-overlapping set of underlying rent data. 
31 We start with more than 110,000 CPS households across both years together.  Nearly 70,000 households are dropped 
because they do not live in one of our 44 MSAs with rent and price data.  Approximately 500 more are discarded 
because the household head is under the age of 25, or they have missing income or mobility information, yielding a net 
sample size of 40,274 households. 
32 For the imputation, we use the entire CPS sample of households, excluding those with heads under the age of 25 or 
in the military.  We form cells, by year, with households within one of seven 10-year age brackets (25-34, 35-44, 45-
54,55-64, 65-74, 75-84, and 85-94), 16 occupations (the CPS’s “major occupation” code), and seven marital statuses 
(the CPS marital status definitions).  As is customary, we use the age and occupation of the household head.  
33 We obtain slightly stronger results below if we impose a different functional form and compute N as 
1/(1−P(STAYS)), instead of as P(STAYS).  
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that the national average homeownership rate has changed by only 4 percentage points in the last 
20 years, from 65 to 69 percent.  While 81 percent of households in Richmond own their house, 
only 33 percent of those in New York City and 53 percent of those in San Jose do.   
The last two columns of table 2 report the means for the top and bottom halves of the 
distributions of the respective variables.  This division corresponds to how we will group the data 
in our empirical work. For example, on average 84 percent of the CPS households did not move in 
the last year.  However, 25 percent (= 1−0.749) of the “mover” households – those below the 
median in the imputed probability of not moving – moved in the last year, while only 6.4 percent (= 
1–0.936) of the “stayer” households – those above the median – moved.  In the next row, the 
market-level rent data is matched to each CPS observation based on its MSA of residence.  
Households who live in “high” rent variance markets have a standard deviation of real rent of 4 
percent, twice that of those in “low” rent variance markets. 
 
III. Empirical methodology and results 
This section empirically examines the hypothesis that the demand for home owning varies 
with net rent risk.  The model in section I assumed a representative agent and perfectly inelastic 
housing supply. In that case house prices would fully capitalize the net rent risk premium, leaving 
all households indifferent between owning and renting. In a more realistic setting with households 
of different horizons, we need to distinguish between effects that vary across housing markets and 
those that affect households within markets.  At the MSA level, house prices would capitalize the 
net rent risk premium of the marginal homebuyer. If the marginal homebuyer in a given market has 
an intermediate horizon such that the rent risk and asset price risk offset each other, the average 
effect of net rent risk on the demand for owning at the MSA level might be small (assuming the 
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average household in the data in the market has a similar horizon as the marginal household). If by 
contrast the marginal homebuyer has a long horizon, then the demand for owning is more likely to 
increase on average with rent risk. Whether this effect shows up in house prices or homeownership 
rates (or both) depends on the elasticity of supply of owned houses.34 If supply is relatively elastic 
(e.g. if new housing units can easily be built, or rental units readily converted to owned 
condominiums and vice versa), then empirically some of the cross-MSA differences in housing 
demand due to net rent risk would show up in the homeownership rate, but they might not show up 
in the price of housing.  On the other hand, if supply is relatively inelastic, MSA-average net rent 
risk would show up in the price but possibly not in the homeownership rate. Empirically we will 
find the latter to be the case.  
Independent of any cross-MSA effect, within an MSA, households with a relatively large 
net exposure to rent risk, in particular households with long expected horizons, should be more 
likely to own.  Since house prices in a market are set by the horizon of the marginal home buyer, 
households that have a longer horizon than this would find the rent insurance benefit of owning to 
be relatively attractively priced: By owning they would receive insurance against a larger number 
of rent risks than the marginal household, and their asset price risk would be more heavily 
discounted, even though they would pay the same house price premium. Conversely, households 
with a shorter horizon would receive a smaller rent insurance benefit for the same premium, 
making owning relatively unattractive. This within-city difference in the tendency to rent versus 
own should be greatest in high rent-volatility cities, since the magnitude of net risk is proportional 
to the rent volatility.   
                                                 
34 The literature has not come to a consensus regarding the elasticity of housing supply.  Bruce and Holtz-Eakin (1999) 
and Sinai (1998) find that supply is relatively elastic while Capozza, Green, and Hendershott (1996) argue that it is 
perfectly inelastic.  Glaeser and Gyourko (2004) point out that when demand falls, at least, supply is inelastic because 
houses are durable. 
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In this section, we will empirically examine the effect of net rent risk on both the 
probability of homeownership and the house price-to-rent ratio.  Starting with homeownership 
rates, we first test whether households with exogenously longer expected horizons (“stayers”) are 
more likely to own in high rent variance places than in low rent variance places, relative to 
households with short horizons (“movers”). Put another way, does the difference in 
homeownership rates between households who have long horizons versus short horizons increase 
with rent variance? We will separately control for the levels of expected horizon (N) and MSA-
level rent variance (σ2r), and focus on their interaction term (Nσ2r). This will minimize any bias due 
to omitted heterogeneity along either the horizon or MSA dimensions separately.  For example, the 
demand for home owning will tend to increase with the horizon N both because of the rent-risk 
mechanism of interest here and because of fixed moving/transactions costs associated with buying 
and selling a house. A household with a shorter horizon in a given location will be less likely to 
own, in order to avoid the fixed costs.  While the model does not formally include transactions 
costs, our empirical control for horizon will control for all horizon effects, including the number of 
rent risks incurred and any fixed transactions costs. Since these transactions costs are unlikely to 
vary systematically with the volatility of rents, the interaction term should reflect only the rent-risk 
mechanism. 
Our second test will focus on the elderly in particular. We will examine whether the 
difference in the probability of homeownership between elderly households in high and low rent 
variance markets decreases as the households get older and thus their expected remaining horizon 
in their residence declines. 
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Third, we investigate whether households which may be more sensitive to rent risk because 
average local housing costs comprise a larger share of their budget are more likely to be 
homeowners in high rent variance markets than in low rent variance markets. 
Turning to house prices, we examine the effect of rent variance on the price-to-rent ratio at 
the MSA level.  In markets where rent variance is greater we would expect to see a larger price-to-
rent ratio, reflecting the additional value of the rent insurance benefit of homeownership above and 
beyond the expected present value of the housing service flow.  To deal with unobserved MSA-
level heterogeneity, we will also look at within-MSA changes in rent variance over time. 
 
III.1 The effect of rent risk on homeownership rates 
 We begin by estimating probit models of the following form using household level data 
from the 1990 and 1999 CPS: 
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where i indexes the household, k the MSA it lives in, and t the year.  OWN is an indicator variable 
that takes the value one if the household owns its house and zero otherwise.  As explained above, 
equation (8) has separate controls for both the volatility of rent and the household’s expected 
horizon, as well as the interaction of these two variables. The standard deviation of rent in market k 
is denoted by σr,k and is computed over the 1980-1989 period for the 1990 observations and over 
1990-1998 for the 1999 observations.  β1 captures the effect of net rent risk on homeownership for 
the average household in each MSA. P(STAYS)i,t is the imputed probability that household i does 
not move during year t, and is our proxy for the horizon N.  Our analysis suggests that the 
probability of owning should increase with horizon and so with P(STAYS), leading to a positive 
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sign for the coefficient β2. However, since other unmeasured factors such as transactions costs can 
work in the same direction, we will not draw strong inferences from the estimates of β2.   
The more compelling test of the rent insurance benefit of owning focuses on β3 and the 
interaction of rent risk and expected horizon, f(σr) * g(P(STAYS))i,k,t in equation (8). The 
difference in the probability of home owning between longer and shorter expected horizon 
households is expected to increase with the rent variance, so β3 is expected to be positive. In 
addition, while unobserved MSA level characteristics could potentially bias the estimated 
coefficient β1 on the standard deviation of rent, the estimated β3 should still be consistent since it 
depends only on the interaction of household level characteristics with the MSA-level rent 
variance.  In effect, we are comparing the homeownership probabilities of long- and short-horizon 
households within each MSA, and in some specifications we add MSA x year fixed effects to make 
that comparison even more explicit.  Thus, in order to affect our results any MSA-level 
unobservable characteristics would need to influence the homeownership decision for long- and 
short-horizon households differentially in each MSA, and that differential impact would have to 
vary across MSAs in a way that happened to be correlated with the rent variance.  We believe this 
to be unlikely. 
Xi is a vector of household level controls from the CPS including log income and dummy 
variables for race, education, occupation, 10-year age categories, and marital status.35  MSA-level 
controls in the vector Zk,t include the average rent and median house price in the preceding year, 
and the average real rent growth and house price growth rates over the preceding nine years.  A 
dummy for 1999 is included to control for the year-specific factors ζt. For robustness we will 
                                                 
35 We can separately control for marital status, age, and occupation, even while including the probability of staying, 
since the latter is imputed using the interaction of marital status, age, and occupation rather than the levels of the  
individual variables. 
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consider various functional-form transformations of the standard deviation of rent, denoted by f(⋅), 
and of the probability of staying, denoted by g(⋅). Since a number of the independent variables, 
including the standard deviation of rent, vary only across markets within a given year, we correct 
the standard errors to account for the correlated shocks within MSA x year cells (unless we directly  
include MSA x year dummies). 
 Table 3 starts by estimating the average effect of rent risk on the probability of home 
owning, restricting β3 to be zero and estimating β1.  The most straightforward method is to compare 
the probability of home owning for households in high rent variance locations versus that for 
households in low rent variance locations.  Thus in the first three columns of table 3, f(σr)k,t is an 
indicator variable that is equal to one when σr,k,t is greater than the median standard deviation of 
rents, which is about 0.027.    
Overall, in column 1 the average household in a high rent variance MSA is only slightly 
more likely to be a homeowner than one that lives in a low rent variance MSA, by β1 = 2.8 
percentage points. However this effect is not statistically significant (the standard error is 2.4 
percentage points). As discussed above, this cross-MSA result could reflect a relatively inelastic 
supply of owned housing, in which case we would expect to see the average effect of net rent risk 
instead capitalized into house prices (below). Or, the result could mean that the rent and asset price 
risks largely offset each other for our sample households with average expected horizons in their 
respective MSAs, in which case there would be little average effect in either ownership rates or 
prices. 
Households with long expected horizons are more likely to be homeowners.  In the first 
three columns of table 3, g(P(STAYS)) equals one for households above the median imputed 
probability of staying and zero otherwise.  In column 1 the estimated coefficient β2 implies that 
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households with the longest horizons, or “stayers”, are 3.6 percentage points more likely to own 
their homes than are “movers.”  Of course, this result could partly reflect transaction costs or other 
omitted variables that are correlated with horizon.  
Column 2 of table 3 reports the results from estimating the full equation (3), now including 
β3.  The interaction term is set to one if the household both lives in an MSA with a standard 
deviation of rent above the median and also is above the median in expected horizon.  The resulting 
estimate of β3 is 0.042 (0.014), and is statistically significant. Thus, relative to the difference 
between “movers” and “stayers” in low rent variance MSAs, “stayers” in high rent variance MSAs 
are 4.2 percentage points more likely to own their home than “movers” in the same places.  For 
comparison, based on the estimate of β1, the shorter horizon households (who have an average 
imputed probability of staying of about 75 percent, or an expected horizon of about four years) are 
less than one percentage point more likely to own their home if they live in a high rent variance 
MSA. These results support the hypothesis that, even controlling for MSA characteristics like 
average house prices and rents, the rent insurance aspect of home owning significantly increases 
the demand for homeownership for households whose horizons are long enough for the rent risk to 
outweigh the house price risk.36  
 Since the horizon/rent-variance interaction term is a combination household/MSA-level 
effect, we can control for all unobserved MSA characteristics and still identify β3.  For that 
purpose, in column 3 we include dummies for each MSA in each year, at the expense of not 
identifying purely MSA-level characteristics such as the average effect of the standard deviation of 
rent.  Unlike the previous column which made use of the cross sectional variation in rent risk and 
homeownership rates between MSAs, this strategy uses only the variation from differences in 
                                                 
36 These results are basically unchanged, and still statistically significant, when interactions between the probability of 
staying and all the observable MSA characteristics (and the year dummy) are included as controls. 
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homeownership between movers and stayers within MSAs.  Although the estimated coefficient β3 
on the interaction term declines in magnitude to 2.9 (1.1) percentage points, it remains significant.37 
Columns 4 to 6 of table 3 impose a different functional form on the standard deviation of 
rent and the probability of staying.  Instead of using an indicator variable for whether a variable is 
above some threshold, we include each variable linearly.  The interaction term is simply the 
product σr * P(STAYS).  In the third row of column 5, the estimated coefficient β3 on the 
interaction term is 8.08 (2.77) and is statistically significant.  The last row of table 3 translates this 
coefficient into an economically more meaningful number by multiplying it by the standard 
deviation of the interaction term, 0.011 (table 2). This value can be interpreted as a measure of the 
exposure to rent risk.  The rent insurance benefit of home owning has a large effect on the 
homeownership rate: a one standard deviation increase in the interaction term, starting at its mean, 
would increase the probability of homeownership by 9.2 percentage points.  Relative to a baseline 
value of 65 percent, this represents an economically significant effect.  When we substitute MSA 
dummies for the MSA-level covariates, in column 6, the estimated coefficient β3 declines slightly 
to 6.10 (1.77), but remains significant.   
The estimated coefficients β1 on the standard deviation of rent σr are consistent with the 
predictions of the model. In column 5, β1 is negative and significant at -6.29 (2.17), indicating that 
for the shortest horizon households, the asset price risk outweighs the rent risk, reducing the 
demand for owning.  However, given the positive coefficient β3 on the interaction term, if the 
expected horizon is greater than 4.5 years (1/(1–6.29/8.08)), the rent risk dominates the asset price 
risk.   This is the case for almost 75 percent of our sample.  In sum, the results of this subsection 
                                                 
37 These and subsequent conclusions persist if we also control directly for house price risk; i.e., the standard deviation 
of house prices computed analogously to rent risk. However, as section I highlights, house price risk is just an 
endogenous function of rent risk. Our analysis, following equation (1), appropriately captures the net effect of both 
risks.  
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indicate that net rent risk significantly affects the demand for owner-occupied housing, with the 
effect increasing in magnitude with households’ horizons, consistent with the analysis of section 
I.38  
 
III.2 Rent risk and housing demand by the elderly 
The value of homeownership as rent insurance may provide a partial explanation for why 
homeownership rates are high among the “younger” elderly and decline as the elderly become 
increasingly old.  One reason that the (younger) elderly might be more likely to own than younger 
households is that, as is often assumed, the elderly might be more risk-averse, and so would place a 
higher value on avoiding net rent risk.39  The model implies that the subsequent decline in 
homeownership with age could be due to the effect of expected horizon (N) on the net rent risk.  
For the elderly, their expected remaining lifetime is a reasonable proxy for their expected horizon 
in their home. Hence as they approach the end of their lives, they expect to face fewer rent shocks, 
which reduces the benefit of owning in terms of avoiding rent risk, and their asset price risk is 
much closer at hand. (The asset price risk might be especially salient if they want to bequeath the 
                                                 
38 One implication of the two-location model is that moving to a correlated housing market leads to less asset price risk 
than moving to an uncorrelated market, since the transaction at the time will be closer to a wash. As long as some 
fraction of the moves in our data are to at least partially uncorrelated housing markets, our measure of expected 
mobility captures the potential asset price risk.  To check this assumption, we imputed the probability of moving 
locally and to non-local housing markets. The CPS reports whether a move was within the same county, so we 
designated within-county moves as local. We used them to compute P(STAYS,local), employing an analogous 
imputation procedure as for computing P(STAYS) for moving in general. (Though to reflect the fact that differences in 
the likelihood of local and non-local moves vary by group within MSA, we used MSAs rather than occupations in the 
imputation cells.)  While we do not know which counties households might move to, on average out-of-county moves 
are more likely to yield lower correlations in housing costs, so we used them to compute P(STAYS, non-local). We 
included P(STAYS,local) and P(STAYS,non-local) and each of their interactions with σr as explanatory variables in 
equation (8).  While for brevity we do not report the results, the coefficient on the interaction of rent variance with 
P(STAYS,non-local) is positive and statistically significant, while the interaction with P(STAYS,local) is 
indistinguishable from zero.  These results persist even in the presence of MSA x year dummies, and are consistent 
with section I.  
39 This assumes that the younger elderly have a long enough remaining horizon such that the net risk premium starts 
positive. Note that young households do not necessarily have longer expected horizons in their residences (N) than the 
younger elderly, since horizon and remaining lifetime do not coincide as closely for the young.  
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monetary proceeds from selling their home at death to their children). Thus even if the younger 
elderly are relatively likely to own (a level effect), we expect to find that their probability of 
owning should decline as they approach the end of their lifetime (a slope effect).   
While one could attribute a rising-then-falling age-profile of homeownership to the rent 
insurance benefit of owning, there are many other possible explanations.  For example, low 
mobility among the younger elderly might explain their higher homeownership rates, and declining 
health that requires nursing-home care might cause them to be more likely to move out as they 
further age.  However, a unique prediction of our model is that the age-profile effects due to the 
rent insurance mechanism should be magnified by the volatility of rents. For instance, risk 
aversion-induced homeownership by the (younger) elderly, as well as the difference in 
homeownership rates between them and younger households, should be greatest in high rent 
variance places, since the value of the rent insurance would be largest there.  Also, the decline in 
the probability of homeownership with age should be steepest in high rent variance locations, since 
the insurance benefit (which increases with the interaction term σ2r × N) is more sensitive there to 
the expected horizon. Other mechanisms affecting the age-ownership profile are unlikely to be 
systematically different in high and low rent volatility MSAs.  Thus we will focus our attention on 
how the slope of the age profile of homeownership varies with rent volatility.40 
The effects of rent volatility can be directly seen in the unconditional homeownership rates 
by age.  Using the pooled 1990 and 1999 CPS cross-sections, we divided our 44 MSAs into high- 
and low-variance markets depending upon whether they were in the top quartile of rent variance or 
                                                 
40 We do not expect differences in the level of homeownership to be very well-identified in the cross-section, so we 
will concentrate on differences in the slope of the age profile.  For example, as the elderly approach the end of life, 
assuming they value the terminal value of their house (perhaps due to the aforementioned bequest motive), the net rent 
risk could become negative if the asset price risk outweighs the few remaining rent risks.  In that case, the older elderly 
in high rent volatility places would be more likely to be renters than those in low rent volatility MSAs, ceteris paribus.  
That negative relationship is a result of those households in high rent volatility MSAs having experienced a more rapid 
decline in their rate of homeownership. This difference in slope is less likely to be contaminated by MSA heterogeneity 
than is the level of homeownership.   
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below the median, and used a kernel regression to compute the unconditional homeownership rate 
by age in both sets of markets.41  The result is presented in figure 1.  By age 40, homeownership 
rates are about 3 percentage points greater in high rent variance MSAs than in low rent variance 
MSAs.  The difference grows with age and peaks for people in their early 60s, with 60-year-olds 
exhibiting homeownership rates of 76 percent in high rent variance MSAs and 72 percent in low 
rent variance MSAs (the level effect). While the unconditional probability of homeownership 
declines with age starting in the late 60s, it does indeed fall faster for people in high rent variance 
MSAs (the slope effect), consistent with the rent insurance mechanism.  By the time people are in 
their late 70s, with presumably short expected remaining lifetimes, the probabilities of 
homeownership in high- and low-rent variance MSAs have converged to approximately the same 
level.   
While figure 1 presents unconditional homeownership rates by age, we would like to 
control for other observable factors that may vary systematically by age or with rent variance.  We 
test these hypotheses with a more parametric specification by estimating the following spline 
equation using a probit model:  
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where AGE is the age in years of the head of the household, UNDER60 is an indicator variable that 
takes the value of one if the head is 60 years old or younger, OVER60 is an indicator variable that 
takes the value of one if the head is more than 60 years old.  In some specifications, f(σr)k,t is a 
dummy variable that equals one if MSA k in year t is in the top quartile of rent variance and zero 
otherwise.  In other specifications, it is the standard deviation of rent entered linearly. The terms 
                                                 
41 Given the relatively small number of elderly in the data, this section emphasizes the top quartile of rent variance in 
order to make its points more starkly. The results are qualitatively similar using the top 50 percent. 
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that are not interacted with f(σr)k,t (those with coefficients γ0 to γ3) correspond to the dashed line in 
figure 1 (low rent variance).  The terms that are interacted (γ4 to γ7) measure the differences in level 
and slope between the solid line in figure 1 (high rent variance) and the dashed line. The hypothesis 
that the younger elderly are in general more risk averse concerning rent volatility implies that γ6 
should be positive (the level effect).  Further, if the age-ownership profile is more steeply declining 
in high volatility MSAs, γ7 should be negative (the slope effect). Once again, the specification 
includes detailed household controls Xi for income, year, race, education, occupation, expected 
mobility, and marital status, as well as MSA x year dummies.  
 The results appear in table 4. The most direct test of the rent insurance mechanism focuses 
on just the elderly, and thus column 1 uses only those households where the respondent is over the 
age of 60.  By including MSA x year effects, we are comparing the slopes of the post-60 age-
homeownership profile in high and low rent variance MSAs but are controlling for differing levels 
of homeownership across MSAs and over time.  The results are consistent with the rent insurance 
mechanism.  Most notably, γ7 is significantly negative, implying that homeownership declines more 
rapidly with age in high rent variance MSAs.  Relative to people over 60 in low rent variance 
MSAs, the probability of homeownership for people over 60 in high rent variance MSAs falls by 
0.29 (0.14) percentage points more per year of age.  This is a considerable difference because, 
controlling for other covariates, the probability of homeownership for people over 60 in low rent 
variance MSAs is nearly constant over their remaining lifetimes. 
 In column 2, we include in the sample households of all ages and constrain the coefficients 
on the covariates to be the same for the entire sample.  We again include MSA x year fixed effects.  
As a baseline, based on γ1, households aged 60 or below in low rent variance MSAs (in the bottom 
three quartiles) have a probability of homeownership that increases at a rate of 1.4 percentage 
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points per year.  In high rent variance MSAs (the top quartile), the probability of homeownership 
rises by γ5 = 0.16 (0.07) percentage points faster than this per year, so that by age 60 households are 
γ6 = 10.4 (3.3) percentage points more likely to be homeowners than people of the same age in low 
rent variance MSAs. Thus homeownership among the younger elderly rises with rent volatility. We 
find virtually the same relative effect for over-60 households as we did before: since γ7 is 
significantly negative, the probability of homeownership declines more rapidly with age for 
households in high rent variance MSAs.42 
These results are generally robust to specification changes.  The last two columns in table 4 
instead parameterize rent variance as a continuous linear function.  We obtain similar qualitative 
effects as in the previous columns, although the interaction of rent variance with age-over-60 (γ7) is 
no longer statistically significant.43  
 
III.3 Rent risk and the market rent-to-income ratio 
 Households for whom housing is a larger portion of their budgets or wealth might be more 
sensitive to net rent risk since they are implicitly taking a larger gamble, and so might be 
effectively more risk averse. We test this “budget share” hypothesis by dividing the sample based 
on the ratio of the average rent in the MSA to actual household income.  We use MSA-level rent 
instead of the household’s own rent since the former is exogenous to the household and is defined 
                                                 
42 The only notable difference between columns 1 and 2 is that in column 2 households over age 60 in low rent 
variance places have homeownership rates that increase with age (γ3).  This result is an artifact of not allowing an 
MSA/year-specific over-60 intercept, as we did in column 1, and constraining the effects of the covariates to be the 
same for young and old households.  This is why we place our emphasis on the difference in slopes between high and 
low rent variance places, which is better identified than the slopes themselves. 
 
43 We have also estimated a quadratic age profile of homeownership, and allowed this profile to be different in high- 
and low-variance MSAs.  Again, younger elderly in high rent variance MSAs have a higher overall probability of 
homeownership, but still exhibit a steeper decline with age, with the differences being statistically significant.  We 
have also replaced the “over 60” indicator with an indicator variable for the household’s head being retired, with 
similar qualitative results. 
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even for homeowners. Households that live in markets where rents are high relative to their own 
incomes would generally need to spend more of their budget on housing to obtain the same housing 
service flow relative to households that live in low rent markets.   
The average effect of the rent-to-income ratio interacted with rent volatility on the 
probability of homeownership is uncertain, since the effect depends on whether rent risk or house 
price risk dominates for the average household.  However, we expect that the demand for owning 
would still increase with horizon more rapidly for high market rent-to-income households.  Further, 
homeownership rates should be highest among those with high rent-to-income ratios, long expected 
horizons, and high rent risk (i.e., interacting all three terms). As before, we estimate a probit model 
on household level data from the 1990 and 1999 CPS: 
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where r/Y is the MSA-rent to household-income ratio. The other variables are defined as in the 
previous subsections. As before, we will estimate two specifications.  First, we estimate a 
discretized specification where high rent variance and “stayer” households are defined relative to 
their respective medians, and high rent-to-income households are those in the top quartile.44 
Second, we let each of the variables enter linearly.45  All regressions include the usual household 
                                                 
44 This cutoff roughly corresponds to households for whom average rents equal a third of their annual incomes.  That is 
the budget allocation to housing typically recommended by financial planners.   
45  For this specification we symmetrically trim the top and bottom one percent of the rent-to-income distribution since 
households with zero or very low values for income appear to have very high rent-to-income ratios and so could 
potentially skew the results. This sampling reduces our number of observations to 39,468 from 40,274 households. 
Predictably, this sampling has virtually no effect on any of the estimated coefficients in the discretized specification in 
columns 1 and 2. It also has little effect on the triple-interaction term in columns 4 and 6, but reduces the magnitude of 
the rent-to-income level and double-interaction terms.  
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controls, and MSA x year dummies which again subsume the uninteracted rent variance 
coefficients ρ1.  
 The results are reported in table 5.  In column 1, we estimate the differential effect of rent 
variance and horizon on high and low market rent-to-income households.  The results are 
consistent with the budget-share hypothesis.  First, according to the estimate for ρ5, stayers who are 
in the high rent-to-income group are 4.4 percentage points more likely to be homeowners than 
movers in that group, relative to the difference in probability of homeownership between stayers 
and movers with low rent-to-income ratios.  Second, the estimated ρ6 implies the same result as in 
table 3: households with longer horizons are more sensitive to rent risk. Stayers in high rent 
variance areas are 3.2 percentage points more likely to be homeowners than are movers, relative to 
stayers and movers in low rent variance areas.  Both of these estimated coefficients ρ5 and ρ6 are 
statistically significant.  Also, households who live in markets where rent-to-income ratios are in 
the top quartile are ρ2 = 3.5 percentage points less likely to own their homes than households with 
low ratios. 
 In column 2 of table 5, we test the triple-interaction effect (N x σr × r/Y): Are the highest 
homeownership rates exhibited by households in high rent volatility MSAs, with long expected 
horizons, and with high market rent-to-income ratios?  Indeed, that is what we find.  Such 
households are ρ7 = 5.4 percentage points more likely to be homeowners, a statistically significant 
effect. This triple-interaction specification controls for unobserved differences between movers and 
stayers, high rent variance MSAs and low variance MSAs, and high rent-to-income and low rent-
to-income households.  It even allows for unobserved differences within the corresponding binary 
interactions: moving/staying and rent variance, rent variance and rent-to-income, and 
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moving/staying and rent-to-income.  The MSA x year effects control for unobserved MSA-level 
characteristics that change over time. 
 In columns 3 through 6, we use different functional forms of the key variables to 
demonstrate the robustness of the results.  In columns 3 and 4, we continue to use an indicator 
variable for high and low rent-to-income households but now let the standard deviation of rent and 
the probability of staying enter linearly.  Since rent/income can be quite high for households with 
very low income, using a dummy for r/Y reduces the impact of the measurement error.  In column 
3, the significant results are that homeownership increases with expected horizon (N), and with the 
sensitivity to rent risk (N*σr).  These results are consistent with those in table 3.  In column 4, we 
still find that rent risk increases the likelihood of homeownership most for households who expect 
to be in their houses longer (N*σr). This effect is increasingly pronounced as the rent-to-income 
ratio increases: in the last row, the estimated coefficient on the triple-interaction term is ρ7 =9.4 
(4.4).  Columns 5 and 6, which also enter rent-to-income linearly, produce qualitatively similar 
results, though the statistical significance of the triple interaction term in column 6 is diminished. 
 
III.4 The effect of rent risk on the price-to-rent ratio 
In this subsection we look for effects of the rent-insurance demand for home owning on 
house prices.  We estimate the following equation in MSA-level panel data using OLS:   
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where (P/r)k,t is the price-to-rent ratio in MSA k in year t, σr,k,t is its standard deviation of rent, and 
Zk,t is its growth rate of real rent.  Since the rent rk,t in the denominator of the dependent variable 
controls for the overall demand for living space, the rent insurance value of ownership should show 
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up as a larger price-to-rent ratio (assuming the supply of owner-occupied housing is not fully 
elastic). That is, using the ratio of prices to rents controls for shocks to the overall housing market, 
which impact both owner-occupied housing and rental housing.  Just as a price-earnings ratio for 
stocks should be higher for firms with higher expected future earnings growth, P/r should be higher 
for MSAs with higher expected future rent growth. Controlling for the growth rate of rent, the 
coefficient κ1 on the standard deviation of rent will then capture the net rent risk premium 
associated with net rent risk, as discussed in section I.  Differences over time that are common to 
all MSAs are controlled for using the year dummies ζt.   
 We estimate this model on the panel of 44 MSAs observed over the 1990-1998 time period.  
For each year t=1990-1998, we calculate real rent variance and growth over the prior (rolling) nine-
year period.  For example, for 1990 σr,k and rent growth are calculated over 1981-1989, and for 
1998 they are calculated over 1989-1997.  
Table 6 reports the results. We find consistent evidence that the rent insurance benefit of 
owner-occupied housing is capitalized into larger price-to-rent ratios.  Column 1 of table 6 presents 
the results from the pooled cross section, without MSA fixed effects. First, the price-to-rent ratio 
significantly increases with real rent growth, with an estimated coefficient of 69.0 (14.7). Hence 
house prices capitalize future rents, as expected. Also as expected, MSAs with more volatile rents 
have a significantly greater price-to-rent ratio, with the estimated coefficient κ1 being 34.5 (11.9).  
The last row of table 6 helps to gauge the economic significance of this result. A one standard 
deviation increase in σr,k,t is estimated to increase the price-to-rent ratio by 0.62.  Since the mean 
price-to-rent ratio is 15.7, this amounts to a 3.9 percent rise in house prices, holding rents constant, 
which is a sizable effect.  Thus, house prices appear to incorporate both expected future rents and 
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the associated risk premia, consistent with the model in section I, and more generally with asset-
pricing models of other, financial assets. 
 We next incorporate MSA fixed effects to control for all MSA-level characteristics that do 
not change over time.  Since the specification also includes year dummies, we are using the within-
MSA variation in rent volatility, rent growth, and the price-to-rent ratio over time to identify the 
rent insurance mechanism.  (Recall that the rent variance σr,k,t and (rent growth)k,t within an MSA 
change over time as the rolling window over which we compute them moves.)  However, the MSA 
dummies remove a potentially powerful source of variation in rent variance, average differences 
across MSAs.46 
 Even controlling for MSA and year fixed effects, in column 2 we find that when rent 
variance in a given MSA is larger, the price-to-rent ratio is in fact higher. The estimated coefficient 
κ1 = 11.0 (5.6) implies that a one standard deviation increase in σr,k,t leads to a 0.20 increase in the 
price-to-rent ratio (last row).  Although smaller than in the previous column, this still implies a 1.3 
percent increase in house prices (from the base P/r ratio of 15.7) for a given rent level, and is 
statistically significant. The smaller magnitude is not surprising considering that only within-MSA 
variation is being used for identification.  Rent growth also continues to have the expected positive 
effect on P/r, with an estimated coefficient of 16.7 (4.7).  In column 3, we account for MSA level 
heterogeneity by estimating equation (4) in first differences.  This specification emphasizes new 
information that arrives over time, since the difference in the computed rent variance between one 
year and the previous year is due to adding the most recent year of data and discarding the oldest 
                                                 
46 Note that one would not expect to find as strong of an effect of rent variance on the probability of home owning 
within MSAs over time, since homeownership and housing construction are slow to respond to changes in rent 
variance.  However, since prices adjust more readily, changes in rent variance should be more quickly incorporated into 
prices and thus be more easily detectable in the data on price-to-rent ratios. 
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year in the rolling window used to calculate σr.  The results are almost identical to those in column 
2, although more precisely measured, with the estimated coefficient κ1 being 10.1 (3.8).47  
 Overall, these results show that at least some of the rent insurance benefits of 
homeownership are capitalized into local price-to-rent ratios, even for the average household. 
These results are consistent with the model in section I, assuming that the supply of owned housing 
is at least partially inelastic, and suggest that the net rent risk premium is positive for our sample 
households with average expected horizons in their respective MSAs.  
 
IV.  Conclusion  
Since every household needs to obtain housing services somehow, house price risk and rent 
risk cannot be studied in isolation. One frequently overlooked but important benefit to 
homeownership is the insurance that it provides against the risk of fluctuations in future rent 
payments. Homeownership provides a guaranteed level of housing services for a fixed up-front 
cost.  In contrast, renters purchase housing services on the risky spot rent market.  While 
homeownership provides a hedge against this rent risk, it is itself risky because owners eventually 
move or die and thus face asset price risk at the time of sale.  However, this asset price risk is lower 
than conventionally assumed. In particular, it is smaller for households with longer effective 
horizons in their homes – either because they plan to live there a long time, or they will move 
within the same housing market or to a correlated market, or they will bequeath their homes to 
heirs who plan to live in the same or correlated housing markets.  In addition, fluctuations in house 
prices generally reflect changes in the present value of future rents, and so in the costs of fulfilling 
                                                 
47 These results persist even when we separately control for the standard deviation of house prices, even though, as 
noted above, it is an endogenous function of rent variance in our framework. 
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households’ short positions in housing. This reduces the aggregate wealth effects from house price 
fluctuations. 
 We presented a simple model of tenure choice with endogenous house prices and both rent 
risk and house price risk.  The demand for homeownership increases with rent risk, given house 
price risk.  Even with endogenous house prices, such that house price risk increases with rent risk, 
demand still increases on net with rent risk for people with long enough expected horizons. These 
people avoid a greater number of rent risks by owning, and their future asset price risk is more 
heavily discounted. Thus the model suggests that the insurance demand for homeownership will 
increase on net with households’ expected horizon, and with the interaction of horizon with rent 
risk.    
 We tested these implications by investigating the effect of rent volatility on the probability 
of home owning and on house prices. We controlled for MSA-level heterogeneity and other factors 
by comparing households that should be differentially affected by rent variance only because they 
have different expected horizons in their residences. This isolated the effect of rent risk from other 
factors that influence homeownership, including transactions costs and other factors correlated with 
horizon or rent variance separately. Notably, we found that households with longer horizons are 
indeed more likely to own in high rent variance MSAs than in low rent variance MSAs, relative to 
households with shorter horizons, as suggested by the model.  A one standard deviation increase in 
the exposure to rent risk (expected horizon interacted with the standard deviation of rent) is 
estimated to lead to a 7 to 9 percentage point increase in the homeownership rate.  Also consistent 
with the model, the younger elderly are particularly sensitive to rent risk, with people aged 60 
residing in MSAs with a top-quartile rent variance being over 10 percentage points more likely to 
be homeowners than people of the same age in low rent variance MSAs.  Confirming that this 
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effect is due to rent risk, the probability of homeownership drops most rapidly with age for elderly 
who live in high rent variance MSAs, consistent with the rent insurance benefit declining with their 
expected horizon.  Also, households for whom market rents are high relative to their incomes 
respond the most to rent risk, especially if their expected horizon is large.  
We also found evidence that some of the insurance demand for home owning shows up in 
the multiple of rents people are willing to pay for houses.  Even controlling for MSA-level fixed 
effects, we found that when MSAs have higher rent variance their house prices are larger relative to 
the rental value of the housing stock. That is, house prices reflect not only expected future rents, 
but also the associated rent-risk premia, consistent with asset-pricing models of financial assets. 
These results have a number of implications for housing markets and other decisions for 
which housing wealth is important, in addition to the aggregate wealth effect already discussed.  
The rent insurance benefit of owning appears to be a significant factor in the demand for 
homeownership.  For comparison, a typical cross-sectional estimate of the user cost elasticity of 
owning implies that a one standard deviation increase in user cost would lead to about a 2.5 
percentage point rise in the homeownership rate. The estimated effect in table 3 of a one standard 
deviation increase in the effective rent variance is about three times larger. 
Another way to gauge the economic significance of the results is to calculate how much 
rent risk contributes to homeownership rates and house prices overall.  Using our estimates from 
the fifth column of table 3, we computed the effect of eliminating rent variance altogether (relative 
to its actual level) on the predicted probability of homeownership.  For the 75 percent of our 
sample households with the longest expected horizons, the likelihood of homeownership would 
significantly decrease in the absence of rent variance, on average by 3.3 percent, as the net rent risk 
avoided by owning is eliminated. For the remaining households, who have short horizons, the 
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probability of homeownership would increase by as much as 10 percent if rent risk were 
eliminated, since for them the asset price risk dominates the rent risk. The effect of rent risk on 
house prices, computed from our estimates in table 6, also is large.  Using the smaller estimates 
from the second column, if there were no rent risk then house prices relative to rents would decline 
by 2.3 percent on average and by as much as 7 percent in some MSAs. 
 For older households, the rent insurance aspect of home owning may help explain why the 
elderly avoid becoming renters and why, if they do, they usually do so very late in life. Because 
they highly value the insurance against rent risk, it is more costly for the younger elderly to become 
renters than previous analyses have assumed.  But as the elderly further age, the asset price risk of 
owning can eventually dominate the risk from renting, making them increasingly likely to become 
renters late in life.  These findings underscore the need for viable reverse mortgage markets to 
enable households to avoid both rent and asset price risk by continuing to own their houses while 
annuitizing their housing wealth.  To date, these markets have not been particularly successful 
[Caplin (2001)].  In their absence, one should not simply assume that the housing wealth of the 
elderly is available for consumption.   
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Table 1: Summary statistics for MSA-level data 
 1990-1998 1998 only 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Standard deviation 
of real rent 0.029 0.017 0.023 0.012 
Standard deviation of real 
house price 0.046 0.031 0.028 0.016 
Real rent growth 0.001 0.019 0.002 0.013 
Real house price growth 0.006 0.031 -0.001 0.021 
Average real rent 6,331 1,505 6,748 1,607 
Median real house  
price  102,773 49,841 107,527 48,415 
Price-to-rent ratio 15.72 4.08 15.52 3.57 
Number of observations 396 44 
 
Notes: The first panel reports the average for all MSAs over the 1990-1998 time period.  The 
second panel reports the average across the 44 MSAs in 1998 only.  The standard deviations of rent 
and house prices, rent growth, and house price growth are all computed over the preceding nine 
years.  The rent data are obtained from Reis.  House price growth is computed from the Freddie 
Mac repeat sales house price index.  To compute the level of house prices, the MSA median house 
price from the 1990 Census is inflated to the current year using the Freddie Mac index.  All dollar 
values are in real (1990) dollars, deflated by the CPI less shelter. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics for CPS data (1990 and 1999) 
 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
Mean if below the 
median 
Mean if above the 
median 
Proportion owning 0.600 0.490   
Proportion not moving  
   (actual P(STAYS)) 0.843 0.363   
Proportion not moving  
   (imputed P(STAYS)) 0.843 0.116 0.749 0.936 
Standard deviation of real rent 0.031 0.013 0.021 0.040 
Probability of not moving x standard 
deviation of real rent 0.026 0.011   
 
Notes: Number of household-level observations is 40,274 from the 1990 and 1999 CPS.  Rent variances are computed over the 1980-
1989 and 1990-1998 time periods.  The rent data are obtained from Reis.  Not moving is defined as having not moved in the preceding 
year. 
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Table 3: The effect of net rent risk on the probability of homeownership 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Indicator variables for  
high rent variance and  
high probability of staying 
Continuous variables 
Standard deviation of 
real rent (σr) [β1] 
0.028 
(0.024) 
0.008 
(0.022)  
0.339 
(0.686) 
-6.285 
(2.174)  
Probability of staying 
P(STAYS): (N) [β2] 
0.036 
(0.011) 
0.015 
(0.013) 
0.020 
(0.011) 
0.652 
(0.070) 
0.395 
(0.095) 
0.448 
(0.081) 
P(STAYS) x s.d. of 
real rent (N × σr) [β3] 
 0.042 (0.014) 
0.029 
(0.011)  
8.081 
(2.771) 
6.100 
(1.772) 
MSA controls Yes Yes No Yes Yes No 
MSA x year dummies No No Yes No No Yes 
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2352 0.2355 0.2498 0.2371 0.2375 0.2520 
A one standard 
deviation in staying x 
σr leads to… 
   
 0.092 (0.032) 
0.069 
(0.020) 
 
Notes: Estimated coefficients are marginal effects from probit regressions of equation (3) 
estimated on 40,274 households in 44 MSAs in 1990 and 1999.  The dependent variable takes the 
value of one if the household is a homeowner.  All specifications include year dummies.  MSA 
controls include median real rent, median real house price, real rent growth, and real house price 
growth.  Household controls include log household income and dummies for the head’s occupation, 
age, race, education, and marital status.  MSAs are deemed to have high rent variance if σr is above 
the median household’s value of  2.8 percent.  The probability of staying is high if the household is 
above the median probability of 88 percent.  All dollar values are in real (1990) dollars, deflated by 
the CPI less shelter.  For specifications that do not include MSA x year dummies, the standard 
errors, in parentheses, are adjusted for correlation within MSA/year. 
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Table 4: Net rent risk and homeownership by the elderly  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Indicator variable for 
 high rent variance Continuous rent variance  
Age if 60 or below [γ1]  
0.0141 
(0.0005)  
0.0086 
(0.0009) 
Age if 60 or below × σr [γ5]  
0.0016 
(0.0007)  
0.056 
(0.025) 
Age > 60 dummy [γ2]  
0.557 
(0.010)  
0.414 
(0.029) 
Age > 60 dummy × σr [γ6]  
0.104 
(0.033)  
3.598 
(1.303) 
Age if over 60 [γ3] 
-0.0006 
(0.0007) 
0.0019 
(0.0009) 
-0.0006 
(0.0016) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
Age if over 60 × σr [γ7] 
-0.0029 
(0.0014) 
-0.0035 
(0.0017) 
-0.0559 
(0.0495) 
-0.066 
(0.059) 
MSA x year  dummies: Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample: Age >60 All Age >60 All 
Number of observations: 9,699 40,274 9,699 40,274 
R-squared 0.1989 0.2526 0.1992 0.2550 
 
Notes: Estimated coefficients are marginal effects from probit regressions estimated on 40,274 
households in 44 MSAs in 1990 and 1999.  The coefficients in brackets correspond to equation (4). 
The dependent variable takes the value of one if the household is a homeowner.  All specifications 
include MSA x year dummies.  Household controls include log household income, probability of 
not moving, and dummies for the head’s occupation, race, education, and marital status.  MSAs are 
deemed to have high rent variance if σr is above the 75th percentile household’s value of 4.1 
percent.  All dollar values are in real (1990) dollars, deflated by the CPI less shelter. 
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 Table 5: Net rent risk and the market rent-to-income ratio 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Indicator variables for 
high rent variance, high 
probability of staying, and 
high market rent-to-income 
Indicator variables for 
high market rent-to-income 
and continuous rent variance 
and probability of staying Continuous variables 
Probability of staying  
(N) [ρ4] 
0.011 
(0.011) 
0.018 
(0.012) 
0.436 
(0.084) 
0.503 
(0.090) 
0.498 
(0.086) 
0.562 
(0.099) 
Market Rent / Household Income 
(r/Y) [ρ2] 
-0.035 
(0.015) 
-0.018 
(0.016) 
-0.034 
(0.056) 
0.202 
(0.109) 
0.217 
(0.058) 
0.377 
(0.135) 
Standard deviation of real rent x 
market rent/income (σr × r/Y) [ρ3] 
0.010 
(0.013) 
-0.021 
(0.020) 
0.170 
(0.515) 
-7.849 
(3.766) 
0.710 
(0.558) 
-4.565 
(4.075) 
P(STAYS) x market rent/income 
(N × r/Y) [ρ5] 
0.044 
(0.013) 
0.017 
(0.019) 
0.026 
(0.060) 
-0.267 
(0.148) 
-0.154 
(0.063) 
-0.343 
(0.157) 
P(STAYS) x standard deviation of real 
rent (N × σr) [ρ6] 
0.032 
(0.011) 
0.018 
(0.013) 
6.761 
(1.822) 
4.643 
(2.064) 
6.470 
(1.805) 
4.377 
(2.408) 
P(STAYS) x s.d. of real rent x  
market rent/income (N × σr × r/Y) [ρ7] 
 0.054 (0.025)  
9.433 
(4.381)  
6.264 
(4.788) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.2565 0.2566 0.2585 0.2586 0.2598 0.2599 
 
Notes: Estimated coefficients are marginal effects from probit regressions of equation (5) estimated on 39,468 households in 44 
MSAs in 1990 and 1999.  Out of the original sample of 40,274 households, the observations with the one percent highest and lowest 
values of market average rent/income r/Y are excluded from the regression.  The dependent variable takes the value of one if the 
household is a homeowner.  All specifications include MSA x year dummies and a full set of household controls including log 
household income and dummies for the head’s occupation, age, race, education, and marital status.  MSAs are deemed to have high 
rent variance if σr is above the median household’s value of 2.7 percent.  The probability of staying is high if the household is above 
the median probability of 88 percent.  All dollar values are in real (1990) dollars, deflated by the CPI less shelter. 
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Table 6: The effect of net rent risk on the price-to-rent ratio 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Standard deviation of 
real rent (σr) 
34.52 
(11.88) 
11.04 
(5.55) 
10.10 
(3.81) 
Real rent growth 68.99 (14.68) 
16.73 
(4.67) 
18.14 
(5.23) 
Controls for MSA fixed 
effects? No 
MSA 
dummies 
First 
differences 
Number of observations 396 396 352 
R-squared 0.0486 0.9471 0.1609 
A one standard deviation 
increase in σr leads to… 
0.62 
(0.21) 
0.20 
(0.10) 
0.18 
(0.07) 
      
Notes: Dependent variable is the price-to-rent ratio.  Estimation is by OLS, following equation (6). 
Standard errors in parentheses.  Number of observations equals 44 MSAs per year over the 1990-
1998 time period.  All specifications include year dummies.  σr and real growth rates are computed 
based on the previous (rolling) nine years.  A one standard deviation increase in σr is 0.018 (from a 
mean of 0.031). The average price-to-rent ratio is 15.72. 
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Figure 1: Kernel-Smoothed Age Profile of Homeownership, by Rent Variance
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